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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL 
IDEOLOGY: AFRICAN LAND TENURE 
SYSTEMSt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most important legal problem faced by decolonized 
African nations has been to reform or implement land tenure sys-
tems which structure distribution of ownership or possessory rights 
among their citizens. Land tenure can be considered one of the 
most significant vehicles for postindependence nation-building in 
Africa. Distribution of land and the definition of property rights in 
general are two preliminary steps in building a strong agricultural 
base and initiating the industrial development which is necessary to 
form a politically and economically independent nation. 
Land tenure systems are the products of many factors, includ-
ing the ideological path a nation chooses through acquiescence in a 
colonial system, revolution, or democratic choice. For example, in 
the land tenure system of a nation which has a predominantly free 
market economy, there is generally an institutionalized respect for 
individual property rights and laws designed to provide incentives 
to maximize production. I A new socialist2 nation, on the other hand, 
will more likely implement laws which collectivize land holdings or 
somehow vest all ownership rights in the sovereign, with occupation 
as the greatest right an individual can have in land.3 African states 
whose legal systems are rooted in or have some elements of Islamic 
law tend to honor the rights of family units above all others.4 
t The author wishes to thank Nathan Gould, Associate Professor of Anthropology,John 
Jay Criminal College, New York, and P. Ehi Oshio, Lecturer-in-Law, University of Benin, 
Nigeria, for their comments on an earlier draft of this Note. 
I Kenya's system, discussed in section Il.A., is such a system. See, e.g., Coldham, A 
Comparative Study of Land Tenure Legislation in Africa, ACTA JURIDICA, 189, 191-96 (1985). The 
term "free market" as used in this Note does not necessarily imply Western-style democracy, 
but is used instead in cases where nations discussed are predominantly capitalist. 
2 The term "socialist" is used in this Note to describe nations whose economies are 
basically socialist in nature, i.e. that include some collectivization of the means of production 
and state ownership, or whose land tenure laws tend to be socialist, whether or not their 
governments profess to be socialist per se. 
3 This is the focus of many Tanzanian land tenure laws, discussed in detail in section 
IIl.A. See Cold ham, supra note 1, at 196-203. 
4 See section IV; see also infra note 123 and accompanying text. A discussion of Islamic 
land tenure is included here because Islam and Islamic law have become increasingly im-
portant international political forces. See Hiro, Riding the Wave of Islam's Past, THE NATION, 
297 
298 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:297 
In measuring the success of such systems, it is easiest to com-
pare a nation's stated goals to statistical performance; but such 
quantitative measurements cannot adequately evaluate a system of 
laws. Instead, in the context of decolonized Africa, the success of 
land tenure laws is most accurately measured in terms of a country's 
ability to accommodate indigenous or customary law5 and to mod-
ernize these legal systems with a view towards economic self-suffi-
ciency and, ultimately, prosperity. 
This Note compares selected free enterprise, socialist, and Is-
lamic nations in Africa in their efforts to reform or establish land 
tenure systems, and to draw from them a model of an effective land 
tenure system. Specifically, it will address the issue of how each of 
these legal systems incorporates elements of customary law and the 
needs of indigenous peoples, and whether these systems are prac-
tical in terms of the realities of modern developmental needs. The 
Note seeks to demonstrate that no single ideological land tenure 
system guarantees complete success and suggests that nations 
should choose from among the most successful elements of these 
systems when creating or seeking to improve systems of their own. 
II. A FREE MARKET MODEL 
A number of decolonized African countries have chosen to 
follow systems of laws, government, and economics similar to those 
Feb. 9, 1985, at 143 (the late Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution have affected 
fundamentalist movements in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Malaysia, Indo-
nesia, the Soviet Union, and among members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization). 
See also Legal Entanglements: Zia Raises Hackles with New Efforts to Expand Islamic Law, FAR E. 
ECON. REv., June 30, 1988, at 30; Jacobs, The Sudan's Islamization, CURRENT HIST., May, 1985, 
at 206. In countries which have adopted it, Islam is more than a spiritual force; it is a 
philosophy which pervades virtually every element of the society, affecting political and 
economic relationships to the extent any conventional ideology does. See, e.g., H. SMITH, THE 
RELIGIONS OF MAN 242-53 (2d ed. 1965). 
5 As used in this Note, the term customary law refers to the laws of the native peoples 
of Africa. In much of colonial Africa, a dual system of laws existed. One set, the English (or 
other European) system, applied to colonists, while the customary system applied to the 
native peoples. There were occasional exceptions, where one system of laws applied to people 
and activities of the other group. Through time, customary law has been forced to change 
in many respects to acco·mmodate major changes introduced by European law. See Allott, 
What is to Be Done with African Customary Law?, 28 J. AFR. L. 56, 56-59 (1984). One distinctive 
attribute of customary law is that it is unwritten and is handed down from generation to 
generation, unlike most Western legal systems. Bennett & Vermeulen, Codification of Customary 
Law, 24 J. AFR. L. 206, 212 (1980). As is discussed in the various sections of this Note, in 
most African countries the customary law with respect to land recognized communal own-
ership and limited individual interests to usufructuary rights. Alienability of land was also 
limited. 
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of their former colonial powers.6 Kenya, a former British colony, is 
one of the continent's most capitalistic nations. While some of its 
neighbors have chosen more revolutionary forms of government, 
Kenya seems content to follow the free enterprise which it inherited 
from its British occupiers. 7 To some degree, the same can be said 
for Malawi, whose president once extolled the virtues of private 
incentive in proposing new land tenure legislation.s The following 
survey of statutes represents, for the most part, the modern history 
and status quo of land tenure legislation in Kenya and Malawi. 
A. Kenya 
Numerous statutory schemes evidence the desire of both the 
departing colonial administration and the postindependence gov-
ernment of Kenya to institutionalize private property rights. As a 
colonial power, the British emphasized individual ownership of land 
in their African colonies.9 Much of the land tenure legislation of 
the late colonial period reflects that emphasis. The land adjudication 
and land registration program initiated in the 1950s, shortly before 
Kenya's 1963 independence, embodies one of the most significant 
approaches to land tenure reform legislation in that era. 10 
Kenya's is a two-part program, which consists of adjudication 
and subsequent registration of title to lands in the "Native Areas" 
of Kenya. 11 The program, first put into effect in the Kikuyu Land 
6 Both Kenya and Malawi, discussed at length in this section, have kept capitalism as 
their economic model. Regarding Kenya, it has been written that its economy is a "pragmatic 
blend of laissez-faire capitalism and indigenous African socialism (the traditional economic, 
political, and social philosophy regulating the activities of African rural society)." FOREIGN 
AREA STUDIES, THE AMERICAN UNIV., KENYA: A COUNTRY STUDY 135 (H. Nelson 3d ed. 
1983) [hereinafter KENYA: A COUNTRY STUDY]. 
7 Since its independence from Great Britain on December 12, 1963, "[t]he postinde-
pendence government has continued the earlier emphasis on the private sector's role in 
development, in marked contrast to the actions of many other Sub-Saharan African countries 
after independence." Id. at 136. 
8 Ng'ong'ola, The Design and Implementation of Customary Land Reforms in Central Malawi, 
26 J. AFR. L. liS, 115 (1982); see also infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
9 See Cold ham, supra note I, at 189. 
10 Id. at 191. Land adjudication and registration is a system in which disputes over title 
to land are officially settled (adjudicated) with title subsequently registered in the name of 
the person in whose favor the dispute is resolved. This system was designed to afford a 
mechanical transition from the nebulous system of customary land ownership to one based 
on English property concepts. Id. at 192. 
II Land in Kenya was commonly referred to as Highlands or White Highlands, and 
Native Areas or Native Lands. Says author Coldham: "In the Highlands the farms were 
large, the agriculture was primarily export-oriented and the applicable land law was based, 
indirectly, on English law. In the Native Lands farms were generally small, agriculture was 
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Unit, 12 involves adjudication and consolidation of landholdings, and 
registration of title. 13 This system typically involves surveying tens 
of thousands of plots of land, settling and adjudicating titles, and 
consolidating and officially registering holdings. 14 Much of this pro-
cess involves administration at the local level, with officials and 
committees from the affected areas helping to adjudicate the hold-
ings and to facilitate the entire procedure. 15 While the Kenyan 
Minister of Lands and Settlement hears ultimate appeals, local ent-
ities administer the rest of the process and judge disputes using 
customary law. 16 
Upon the adjudication of a title dispute, the victor gains reg-
istration as the individual owner of the plot and wins 
absolute ownership of that land subject only to leases, charges, 
encumbrances, etc[.] shown on the register and to overriding 
interest. The land ceases to be subject to customary law and is 
governed by the complete code of substantive and conveyancing 
law, based broadly on English law, contained in the Registered 
Land ACt. 17 
Such security of title and simplified conveyancing are the legal 
guarantees of private ownership of property. IS Theoretically, a 
farmer will make a greater financial or labor commitment to develop 
the plot he farms if his ownership is secure. The same is true of 
the simplification of title registration. Ideally, landowners in Africa, 
as in all places, should be able to alienate their land easily and 
efficiently in order to guarantee maximum productivity on an in-
dividual and national level. 
This economic incentive theory was also the focus of the so-
called Swynnerton Plan, which seems to have provided much of the 
for subsistence or (less commonly) for the local market and customary law applied." Id. at 
191. 
12 The Kikuyu Land Unit was a native land unit where much of the land in question 
was disputed, overcrowding was a serious problem, and landholding was critically frag-
mented.ld. 
13 Id. 
14 For an informative and detailed description of the adjudication process, see Coldham, 
supra note 1, at 191. 
15 Id. at 192. 
16 Id. It is presumed from this description of the law that the local boards do not rely 
on English property law principles in resolving the disputes that come before them, but 
instead use native customs or customary laws. 
17 Cold ham, supra note 1, at 192. 
18 Id. at 194. 
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basis for the land tenure reform in Kenya. 19 It proposed that '''the 
African farmer ... be provided with such security of tenure through 
an indefeasible title as will encourage him to invest his labour and 
profits into the development of his farm and as will enable him to 
offer it as security against financial credits."'2o Ideally, with guar-
antees that title to their lands would be secure, farmers with poor 
or unworkable plots would sell them to others in a better position 
to develop them.21 This design would maximize efficiency, it was 
argued, because ''' ... energetic or rich Africans [would] be able to 
acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less [although this 
would create] a landed and a landless class . . . . "'22 
Another very significant piece of land tenure legislation in 
Kenya was the Land Control Act of 1967.23 In order to strengthen 
the rule of the official system of registration, the original version of 
the Land Control Act provided, in section 6, that transactions in 
land controlled by the adjudication and registration system would 
become void after three months unless the parties obtained the 
consent of the Land Board.24 The apparent purpose of this provi-
sion was to ensure reliance on the official system of land transfer. 
The Act goes further in its attempts to discourage transactions in 
land that do not respect the new registration system: section 7 of 
the Act provides that no damages other than the price paid for 
such a void transaction can be recovered by one who has purchased 
land and failed to comply with section 6.25 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Kenya implemented several other 
land tenure programs which tended to further this policy of pri-
19 The Swynnerton Plan was completed in 1954 at the height of Kenya's Mau Mau 
emergency-an uprising of a secret organization of native Kenyans allegedly seeking to expel 
Europeans from the country-and proposed serious agricultural reforms for Kenya. It was 
headed by R.J.M. Swynnerton who was director of the Department of Agriculture at the 
time. Aside from the philosophical bases discussed in the text, the plan also proposed 
expansion of export crops, a major source of foreign exchange. KENYA: A COUNTRY STUDY, 
supra note 6, at 29-31; see also Coldham, supra note 1, at 195. 
20 Coldham, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting R.J.M. SWYNNERTON, A PLAN TO INTENSIFY 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE IN KENYA § 13 (1954) [hereinafter SWYNNER-
TON]). 
21 Coldham, supra note 1, at 195. 
22 Id. (quoting SWYNNERTON § 14). Swynnerton thought this '''a normal step in the 
evolution of a country.'" Id. 
29 Id. at 196; see also Cotran, The Development and Reform of the Law in Kenya, 27 J. AFR. 
L. 42, 59 (1983). 
24 See Cotran, supra note 23, at 59. A 1980 amendment to the Act apparently tried to 
alleviate this hardship, but it is not clear if it has succeeded in doing so. Id. 
25 !d. 
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vatization. A favorite of the British colonial administration was the 
so-called Million Acre Scheme, first introduced in 1962, just a year 
before Kenya's independence .. Under this plan land was to be di-
vided "into relatively large plots to be owned by wealthier and more 
experienced 'progressive' farmers . . . . These wealthier farmers 
were thought to be the only Africans capable of keeping the former 
European farms commercially viable. "26 The British government 
provided funding for the purchase of European lands from these 
so-called Scheduled Areas, so that Africans could settle and register 
the lands.27 Eventually, however, authorities divided the land into 
smaller plots.28 The purpose of the Million Acre Scheme was to 
force more rapid redistribution of land.29 Following the Scheme, a 
government report30 reevaluating Kenya's land settlement pro-
grams concluded that, contrary to the original plan which intended 
distribution of already divided plots, Kenya should distribute, 
through private sales, the majority of the remaining European 
farms. 31 
This overall emphasis on individual title to land ran contrary 
to the customary land law of Africans who lived in Kenya. Under 
customary law, the rights of individuals to plots of land were usuf-
ructuary only, though individual farmers could pass land on to their 
heirs.32 Ownership was generally vested in a lineage or clan, and a 
chief or a group of elders controlled the lands held by such groups.33 
Clearly, government efforts toward privatization of land ownership 
were bound to conflict with this system of land tenure. 
There is one notable exception to this privatization and indi-
vidualization of property in Kenya, however, which serves as an 
excellent example of legal accommodation of custom. In the case 
of Masailand, the government implemented a different system es-
tablishing large group ranches, pursuant to Kenya's Land (Group 
Representatives) Act of 1968.34 The government implemented this 
26 Sampliner, Zimbabwe's Land Resettlement Program: Lessons from Kenya and Algeria, 5 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 49, 63 (1983). 
27 KENYA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 142. 
28 Sampliner, supra note 26, at 63. 
29 Id. 
30 The report was the end product of the Stamp Mission, created in 1965 to reevaluate 
the Million Acre Scheme. Maxwell Stamp, the head of the mission, was a British economist. 
Id. at 65. 
31 Id. 
32 KENYA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 141. 
33 Id. 
34 Cold ham, supra note I, at 193. This law was enacted in 1968. See also KENYA: A 
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 142-43. 
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system to "protect [the Masai, who are nomadic pastoralists] from 
increasing encroachment on their traditional grazing grounds by 
individual farmers and partly to settle them on ranches where they 
could be provided with credit and services and gradually drawn 
into the national economy."35 By providing special large ranchlands 
for the Masai which would not be divisible into individual plots, the 
Kenyan government was able to legislate without completely dis-
rupting the customs of this population. This appears to have been 
virtually the only major exception to the adjudication program.36 
Another statute, the Magistrate's Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act 
of 1981, has won praise for its accommodation of some elements of 
customary law.37 Under this act, a panel of community elders hears 
some of the disputes.38 This is the first act in Kenya which actually 
brings lay people back into such an important area of the law.39 
The act is noteworthy as a successful attempt by Kenyan officials to 
restore some credibility to the country's land tenure legislation 
through respect for the customary use of elders in land dispute 
resolution. 
B. Malawi 
Malawi, like Kenya, was a British colony for many years. After 
gaining independence in 1964,40 Malawi's government pursued an 
economic course consistent with the capitalism of its mercantilist 
predecessors,4l Its land tenure reform policies reflected this course: 
35 Coldham, supra note 1, at 193. 
36 Masai in Kenya's Narok District have said that there is, nevertheless, a tendency there 
to seek to subdivide the ranches for individual ownership. KENYA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra 
note 6, at 143. 
37 Id. Cotran also criticizes this act for the conflict inherent in providing that a district 
officer will serve as an administrator of the act yet also serve as an adjudicating officer. Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Malawi was a British colony from 1891, when a protectorate was first established, 
until its independence on July 6, 1964. H. NELSON, AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI 1 (1975) 
[hereinafter AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI]. 
41 One source says this of Malawi's economic policies: 
The policies pursued by the government in managing the economy since indepen-
dence had drawn exceptional praise from world organizations as being both prudent 
and dynamic. The cautious, conservative approach to fiscal and monetary policy and 
the generally deliberate pace of nationalization during the first ten years of inde-
pendence had created a climate unusually attractive to foreign investment and 
foreign aid. 
!d. at 192. 
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in 1967 the President of Malawi42 implored the legislature to adopt 
land tenure reform legislation which would strongly encourage and 
reward private initiative in the agricultural sectorY 
In the 1960s, the legislature enacted several major statutory 
schemes to reform Malawi's land tenure system. The Registered 
Land Act, enacted in 1967,44 "provided the machinery for register-
ing titles to land, including allocated land, and the new substantive 
land law applicable thereto."45 Another significant part of this leg-
islative scheme was the Local Land Boards Act, also enacted in 
1967,46 which, in turn, "provided the machinery for controlling 
dealings in allocated land after registration."47 These statutes, taken 
together, worked very much like the Kenyan adjudication and reg-
istration legislation mentioned previously in this Note.48 
Arguably, the single most important land tenure legislation in 
postindependence Malawi is the Customary Land (Development) 
Act (C.L.D.A.), also enacted in 1967.49 As with many of the land 
tenure laws of Malawi, the C.L.D.A. "shows an ingenious blend of 
indigenous provision and borrowings from legislation of other 
countries .... "50 The primary purpose of the C.L.D.A. was to 
determine officially and to register ownership interests in land, 
much like the Kenyan adjudication process.51 The C.L.D.A. placed 
a premium on allocating land in areas of the country where "'it 
appear[ed] expedient to the Minister [responsible for land matters] 
that the ascertainment of interests in customary land and the better 
42 Dr. H. Kamazu Banda became President in 1966 and Life President in 1971. THE 
STATESMAN'S YEAR-BoOK 826 (J. Paxton 126th ed. 1989-90). 
43 Ng'ong'ola, supra note 8, at 115. This passage set the tone of the legislation, which 
was supposed to help land development: 
[d. 
First by accepting and recognising the principle or idea of individual ownership of 
land and secondly by insisting that anyone who owns land, whether as an individual 
or as the head of his or her family, is strictly responsible for the economic and 
productive use of his or her land; otherwise it must be taken away. 
44 AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI, supra note 40, at 239. 
45 Ng'ong'ola, supra note 8, at 116. 
46 [d. 
47 Id. 
48 See supra section II.A. 
49 Ng'ong'ola, supra note 8, at 116; see also AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI, supra note 40, 
at 239. 
50 Ng'ong'ola, supra note 8, at 117. In fact, "[t]he basic provisions in the C.L.D.A. on 
ascertainment of rights and interests in customary land were adapted from Part II of the 
Sudan Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance, 1925." Id. 
51 See generally id. 
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agricultural development of such land in any area should be ef-
fected .... "'52 
While the adjudication process in Malawi was equally ambitious 
in its promotion of capitalist property institutions, it was far more 
respectful of customary law than its Kenyan analog. The C.L.D.A. 
established small local committees with simple duties which were 
responsible participants in the process. 53 The C.L.D.A. designed 
these committees to work in conjunction with the official allocation 
team assigned to the area in question, and they concerned them-
selves with the role of customary law in the process. 54 The allocation 
teams, on the other hand, were agents of the state, in which the 
authority for land allocation under the program ultimately rested.55 
The inclusion of the local committees allowed Malawi to avoid some 
of the conflicts between the new laws and custom which Kenya 
experienced. 56 
The Malawi allocation system itself is a multipart process.57 The 
allocation stage entails division of the designated development area 
into sections, with subsequent publication of notices defining the 
limits of the area so that people with potential disputes would have 
sufficient time to make a complaint and to defend whatever rights 
they feel have been threatened. 58 As soon as this is done, "the 
powers of customary authorities over [the] land cease. [In addition,] 
except with the consent in writing of the Allocation Officer, no 
person or customary owner can proceed with or take cognisance of 
any dispute concerning land."59 Then, at the second stage of the 
process, a demarcation officer entertains claims on lands allocated 
pursuant to the terms of the allocation statutes.60 The C.L.D.A. also 
retains for the government a degree of regulatory control with 
respect to the public's need for land: 
Section 13 [of the C.L.D.A.] empowers the Demarcation Officer 
to set aside land required for the present and future needs of 
the community, such as roads, village sites, public buildings and 
open spaces; effect measures prescribed for any development 
scheme; demarcate rights of way to provide access to public 
52 Id. (quoting section 3 of the C.L.D.A.). 
53 Id. at 117-18. 
54 Ng'ong'oJa, supra note 8, at 118. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 119. 
57 Id. at 118-19. 
58 !d. at 118. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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roads or watering places; re-align boundaries; terminate all un-
necessary customary rights; and most important, 'if he considers 
the existing lay-out of the land to be uneconomic or inconven-
ient for the use of the land or inconsistent with the development 
scheme, prepare a fresh lay-out and by exchange of land or 
otherwise adjust the existing layout.'61 
It is in the third, or registration, stage of the process that the 
Malawian land tenure regime differs from the Kenyan. As in Kenya, 
customary ownership of land in Malawi was communal; individuals 
generally had no more than usufructuary rights and disposal rights 
were exercised by the chief or headman of the group.62 In this third 
stage of the process, these customary rights are institutionalized: 
the survey officer surveys the now legally defined property, a re-
cording officer prepares a record of all such plots, and customary 
owners are recorded as '''owners, joint owners or owners in com-
mon, or as owners of family land."'63 
Section 20 of the C.L.D.A. also demonstrates the Malawi gov-
ernment's desire to protect customary rights. The legislation pro-
vides that pieces of land which fall "into the category of village 
residential land; dambo land (normally used for grazing); unallo-
cated garden land; or land used for any other special purposes of 
the community; should be recorded as customary land."64 This 
would seem to contradict the principal terms of the statute, i.e. to 
divide and privatize customary lands, but authorities suggest that 
the lands protected by section 20 are not very significant and that 
future division of these lands remains a possibility.65 These elements 
of the process demonstrate both the government's commitment to 
private property rights and to maintenance of respect for customary 
rights. 
C. Free Market Land Tenure: Criticisms and Comments 
In summary, the model free enterprise or capitalist land tenure 
system ordinarily has at least the following characteristics: a strong 
61 Id; see also J.D.A. BROOKE-TAYLOR, LAND LAW IN MALAWI (TEXT) 313 (1977). It is 
unclear, however, how much more power this provision grants the government compared 
with the concept of eminent domain. 
62 AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI, supra note 40, at 240. As in Kenya, individuals could 
inherit the right to use land from kin, though this right was subject to approval by the tribal 
authority. These descriptions of customary rights in land are general, as there was some 
variation among different ethnic groups in Malawi. Id. 
63 Ng'ong'ola, supra note 8, at 119 (quoting § 19(2) of the C.L.D.A.). 
64 Id. at 120. 
65 See id. 
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legal commitment to the concept of private property with little or 
no regard to contrary ideals of customary law, an aggressive form 
of determining private, individual ownership of plots of land, and 
a system of title registration.66 Occasionally, countries following this 
model will demonstrate some institutionalized respect for customary 
law through statutory recognition of rights of familial, as opposed 
to individual, succession and joint ownership oflands.67 This model, 
however, invariably produces confusion and conflict, and· can ac-
tually undermine the very objectives which governments set out to 
achieve. 
Both the Kenya and Malawi programs have been criticized for 
their inability to accommodate customary law effectively. The re-
sulting friction between the old and new legal systems in these 
countries illustrates the difficulty which inflexible ideological sys-
tems have in effecting the needed transition to economic prosperity. 
For example, though Kenya has experienced some economic suc-
cess,68 the Kenyan statutory scheme's reliance on the capitalistic 
notion of security of individual title has created confusion, with true 
title to target lands often still in dispute. One scholar, Simon Cold-
ham, observes: "if registered proprietors regard the land adjudi-
cation programme as simply a means of securing boundaries and 
continue to deal with their land according to customary law, then 
the system is not going to operate effectively. Abundant evidence 
exists to show that this is indeed happening in Kenya."69 Coldham 
adds that "[ m ]ost striking ... is the fact that the large majority of 
successions is not registered" as mandated by the statutes' express 
terms.70 The potential for this friction to turn into disaster is clear: 
66 The best example of these two characteristics is the Kenyan system found in the land 
adjudication and registration laws. See generally Cold ham, supra note 1, at 191-96. 
67 This is exemplified in Malawi's Customary Land (Development) Act. See generally 
Ng'ong'ola, supra note 8, at 115. 
68 According to the United States State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs, Kenya's 
1986 Gross Domestic Product was $6.722 billion. Agriculture represented 30% of its G.D.P. 
in 1985. With a 1987 population of approximately 21,600,000 people, the nation's per capita 
income was $322 (1986). Additionally, its annual G.D.P. growth rate was 4.9%. BUREAU OF 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8024, BACKGROUND NOTES: KENYA 1 (Jan. 
1988) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: KENYA). Its G.D.P. (at factor cost) at independence 
(1963) was approximately $778 million. A. KAMARCK, THE ECONOMICS OF AFRICAN DEVEL-
OPMENT 250-51 (1967). 
69 Coldham, supra note 1, at 194. Cold ham suggests that heads of household frequently 
ignore the new legal systems and continue to divide and sell land without registration. This 
problem, if allowed to go unchecked, could clearly undermine the entire land registration 
system. [d. 
70 [d. 
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"[t]he less the land register reflects what is happening on the 
ground, the greater the likelihood of disputes arising in the future, 
of the same kind as were settled at the time of land adjudication. 
Indeed, in some areas land adjudication may have to be repeated."71 
One can imagine the detrimental effect such a time-consuming 
endeavor would have on Kenyan land development. 
As African scholar Clement Ng'ong'ola describes, Malawi went 
further in its efforts to codify some customary rights in the 
C.L.D.A., partly in response to the Kenyan experience: 
The Malawi provision was designed to mitigate some of the 
harsh consequences of [allocation] principles by providing for 
the demarcation, recording and registration of family titles as 
an exception to the general granting of individual titles. It was 
also the prevailing view that individualisation of customary ten-
ure was not as well advanced as it was in Kenya to permit 
wholesale introduction of individual titles. 72 
But the Malawi statutes have also failed in certain respects. In fact, 
Ng'ong'ola suggests that "because of [the] selective approach [ofthe 
statutes], the impact ofland reforms on peasant agriculture is bound 
to be minimal for a while yet."73 Such criticism, if valid, indicates 
that the legislation could conceivably fail in reaching its original 
objective of encouraging individual ownership and private initiative 
in the agricultural sector. 74 Certainly a country as poor as Malawi 
cannot afford such a failure. 75 
III. A SOCIALIST MODEL 
A number of newly independent African nations have chosen 
some form of socialism as their preferred form of law and gover-
71 Id. This is clearly a possibility if landowners continue to divide and convey land 
without regard for official registration procedures. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
72 Ng'ong'ola, supra note 8, at 119. 
73 Id. at 131. 
74 In fact, "[d]espite the growing land hunger, cultivators having customary access to 
land for cultivation have shown very little interest in taking advantage of the laws that 
encourage registration of permanent title." AREA HANDBOOK FOR MALAWI, supra note 40, at 
240. 
75 At independence Malawi was considered one of the world's 25 poorest nations, a 
distinction which the country unfortunately has had problems overcoming. Id. at 2, 191. 
United States Department of State statistics on Malawi for 1985 show a population of some 
7,100,000 people and a Gross Domestic Product (1984) of $1.19 billion. Thirty-seven percent 
of the G.D.P. was derived from agriculture. Its 1984 per capita income amounted to about 
$175. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 7790, BACKGROUND NOTES: 
MALAWI 1 (Sept. 1985) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: MALAWI]. Malawi's market price 
G.N .P. was $147 million at independence (1964). KAMARCK, supra note 68, at 250-51. 
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nance. These countries are similar to the free enterprise or capital-
istic countries in that they also must address the problem of land 
tenure reform in order to establish a viable agricultural and indus-
trial base for their future economic well-being. 
A. Tanzania 
Tanganyika,76 the predecessor nation to Tanzania, was placed 
under a League of Nations Mandate after World War I, with Great 
Britain as its mandatory.77 The creators of the mandate required 
that the British "take into consideration native laws and customs 
and ... respect the rights and safeguard the interests of the native 
population" when making laws relating to property rights. 78 The 
Tanganyikan Land Ordinance of 1923 could be considered a pre-
cursor to today's socialist system in the land tenure area: 
[The statute] declared that, apart from titles previously acquired 
(which were converted into their nearest equivalents in English 
law, i.e. freeholds or leaseholds), all lands in the territory, 
whether occupied or unoccupied, were public lands to be held 
and administered by the Governor for the use and common 
benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of Tanganyika.79 
Nonetheless, the ordinance set up a system of rights of occupancy 
which was never very successfu1.80 By the time Tanganyika achieved 
independence, most natives still lived in small settlements, where 
they practiced traditional methods of farming. 81 
76 Tanganyika. which achieved independence from Great Britain in 1961, was joined 
with Zanzibar, which gained its independence from Britain in 1963, to form the modern 
nation of Tanzania in 1964. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8097, 
BACKGROUND NOTES: TANZANIA 4 (July 1986) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: TANZANIA]. 
Tanzania had an estimated population of 22,300,000 in 1985. Its 1984 estimated Gross 
Domestic Product was $4.1 billion and its per capita income was $200. Agriculture repre-
sented approximately 33% of Tanzania's G.D.P. Id. In 1964, Tanzania (without Zanzibar) 
had a factor cost G.D.P. of $684 million. Its G.N.P. was $725 million. KAMARCK, supra note 
68, at 250-51. 
77 Coldham, supra note 1, at 196. After World War I, the former colonial possessions of 
defeated Germany and her allies were administered as mandates under the auspices of the 
newly established League of Nations. See MARGALITH, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATES 26-34 
(1930). 
78 Coldham, supra note 1, at 196 (citing Article 6 of the Mandate). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 197. 
81 Id. According to author Coldham, this was one of several reasons why the law was 
unsuccessful. He also mentions the fact that land shortages and increases in landlessness had 
developed in some parts of Tanzania. Id. 
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The postindependence government of Tanzanian PresidentJu-
lius Nyerere, one of Africa's most committed socialists, was quick 
to extend "its predecessor's policy of attaching conditions to titles 
in order to secure development."82 This notion, of course, was 
consistent with Nyerere's vision of an egalitarian Tanzanian society 
based on communal ownership and production of goods.83 Thus, 
unlike Kenya, where privatization of land was pursued ambitiously, 
the Tanzanian government under Nyerere first converted all free-
holds into leaseholds.84 All government leaseholds, in turn, were 
converted into rights of occupancy.85 This two-step conversion has 
had the effect of nationalizing land in Tanzania.86 The powers of 
the president under authority of these statutes were tremendous: 
he was authorized to revoke rights of occupancy, seemingly at will, 
and could direct that any assessment of compensation to former 
owners or occupiers of such land could consider any prejudice to 
the national economy caused by inadequate development of the 
land in question.87 
Coldham writes that a unique and curious aspect of land tenure 
legislation in Tanzania, a nation with a vested interest in strict 
regulation of rights in land, is the relative paucity of such legisla-
tion.88 This may indicate a concern for customary law not found 
elsewhere. Lack of a legal framework for land tenure reform may, 
in part, be due to the following: 
Nyerere and other [Tanganyika African National Union or 
T ANU] leaders [genuinely believe] that reforms should not be 
imposed from above but should evolve in response to grass-
roots demands .... Moreover, Nyerere is committed to creating 
a classless society in Tanzania and to achieving rural socialism 
even at the price of reducing agricultural productivity, and no 
8. Coldham, supra note 1, at 197. 
8S See FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, THE AMERICAN UNIV., TANZANIA, A COUNTRY STUDY 87 
(I. Kaplan 2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter TANZANIA: A COUNTRY STUDY]. Nyerere was President 
of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985. Since 1985, he has had influence in national politics as 
chairman of Tanzania's single party, Chama cha Mapinduzi, which was granted supremacy 
over the government by the constitution of 1977. BACKGROUND NOTES: TANZANIA, supra note 
76, at 6. 
84 Coldham, supra note 1, at 197. 
85 [d. By this method, privately owned lands were gradually taken by the government, 
which subsequently allowed only occupation, and presumably use, of the land by former 
owners, tenants, etc. The Freehold Titles (Conversion and Government Leases) Act, 1963 
achieved this. See TANZANIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 83, at 196-97. 
86 See id. 
87 Coldham, supra note 1, at 198. 
88 [d. 
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doubt he feels that progress towards these goals would be hind-
ered if lawyers and courts were involved.89 
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There are two other significant pieces of legislation in Tanzania 
which reflect Tanzania's distaste for privatization of property. The 
first, The Rural Farm Land (Acquisition and Regrant) Act of 1966 
allows the government to "acquire" any rural farm land, compen-
sating owners at its discretion, then to grant the land to the person 
who has been cultivating it if that person has made substantial 
improvements to the land.90 The second, the Urban Leaseholds 
(Acquisition and Regrant) Act of 1968, essentially gives the govern-
ment the same powers with respect to urban land.9 ! In addition to 
the Urban Leaseholds (Acquisition and Regrant) Act, the govern-
ment also instituted the Acquisition of Buildings Act of 1971, en-
abling the president to acquire buildings where and when he de-
termined it would be in the public interest to do SO.92 This statute 
is perhaps the farthest-reaching in expressly providing that com-
pensation need not be provided to an owner who has owned the 
building in question for more than ten years. 93 
The most significant and unique aspect of Tanzanian land ten-
ure laws, however, is the village settlement programs, which are 
examples of home grown collectivization of property and the foun-
dation of Nyerere's vision of African socialism for Tanzania.94 The 
first such program was the village settlement policy, announced in 
1962, establishing numerous villages throughout the country "char-
acterized by the detailed provisions regarding land tenure and other 
aspects of their organization."95 Property rights were vested in the 
Rural Settlement Commission and later in the Village Co-Operative 
Society, which would administer village lands and allocate 
use thereof. 96 The most widely known program, the ujamaa97 vil-
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Coldham, supra note 1, at 198. 
92 Id. 
93 /d. 
94 As one commentator said of collectivization of lands and its relationship to socialism 
in Tanzania: "Collective organizations promote socialist principles and alleviate social prob-
lems .... " R.W. JAMES, LAND TENURE AND POLICY IN TANZANIA 169 (1971). See also TANZANIA: 
A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 83, at 139. 
95 Coldham, supra note 1, at 199. 
96 Id. The villages were model settlement schemes and were basically economic collec-
tives. 
97 The word ujamaa is often translated as "familyhood." TANZANIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, 
supra note 83, at 7. Since 1962, the Kiswahili word has been used by Nyerere and other 
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lages,98 was initiated by President Nyerere in 1967. This program 
"reflect[ed] the new emphasis on self-reliance, on socialist ideals and 
on the need for a frontal approach to the problems of rural devel-
opment .... "99 These villages, too, are organized on a collective 
farming model,lOo and by the late 1970s, ninety percent of the 
population of Tanzania was living in 8000 ujamaa villages. 101 The 
Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Ad-
ministration) Act of 1975 provides some legal framework for the 
villages, and directs that the village councils shall have widespread 
responsibility for allocating farm land to individuals and families 
within the village unit.102 Individual ownership by village members 
is strictly controlled. 103 
B. A Socialist Model: Does It Work? 
A socialist model of land tenure legislation would, therefore, 
include nationalization of landholdings with broad state power to 
take, redistribute, and designate uses of land.104 Also, collectiviza-
tion of land, especially in the agricultural sector, and emphasis on 
the communal lifestyle of villages or some similar unit, to use the 
Tanzanian example, would all be key elements of such a model.105 
An important theme in African socialist land legislation and prop-
erty rights in general is that private interest must give way to the 
state's perception of the common good. 106 This is a basic tenet of 
socialism, and its application in Africa has provided some interesting 
results, including Tanzania's unique villages program. 107 
Tanzanian officials to describe the communal society to which they aspire. BACKGROUND 
NOTES: TANZANIA, supra note 76, at 6. 
98 Cold ham, supra note 1, at 199. 
99 [d. 
100 Ujamaa is the ultimate goal of the village programs, but in order to achieve this stage, 
people first had to live in villages, cooperating with each other while receiving social services 
and education, in preparation for the final, or ujamaa, stage. TANZANIA, A COUNTRY STUDY, 
supra note 83, at 90; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
101 Coldham, supra note 1, at 200. 
102 [d. at 201. 
lOS [d. Individual ownership is limited to such things as livestock and small tools and 
other farm implements. [d. 
104 This is evidenced in such laws as Tanzania's Rural Farm Land (Acquisition and 
Regrant) Act 1966, discussed supra, section lILA. 
105 The ujamaa villages and the idea of virtually absolute sovereign ownership of lands 
exemplify these concepts. See Cold ham, supra note 1, at 196-203. 
106 This is evidenced by the statutes discussed in section lIl.A. 
107 See supra section lILA. 
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The Tanzanian concept that all land belongs to the government 
appears to have some foundation in the customary law of the pre-
colonial period. Under customary African land law in Tanzania, the 
occupant of a plot of land had only usufructuary rights. lOS These 
usufructuary rights were essentially guaranteed by the community, 
which had superior rights in the land, as long as the farmer contin-
ued to cultivate the land and "conducted himself properly in the 
eyes of his society."109 These rights could be inherited, but could 
not be disposed of by the individual. llo 
Despite what seems to be a strong effort by postindependence 
governments to accommodate these customary notions of com-
munal ownership, socialist land tenure systems such as that of Tan-
zania are criticized for their insensitivity to customary law and their 
inability to accommodate it. Much of this criticism is, no doubt, 
quite valid. The socialist systems do have some merit, however, as 
they may help to effect a smooth transition from tribal to individual 
property rights. 
With respect to the ujamaa village resettlement program in 
Tanzania, for example, a typical criticism is that the communal 
lifestyle and collectivized farming of the villages are counterintuitive 
for native Tanzanians and that, as a result, production as a whole 
has not met the expectations of the nation's governors. I I I Coldham 
observes simply: "the notion of collective production found no place 
in customary land law."1l2 Even though there was some idea of 
collective rights in customary land law regarding community prop-
erty such as water and wood, "the principles governing the alloca-
tion and inheritance of land stressed individual rights and duties, 
and the basic production unit was the family."ll3 There was, then, 
tremendous conflict between the village settlement concept and 
tradition because the cooperation and sharing that existed in tra-
ditional Tanzanian society was limited to kin groups or tribes and 
could not be easily extended to groups as large as those envisioned 
by these programs.1l4 In their favor, however, one can say that the 
108 TANZANIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 83, at 194. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. Evidently, however, transfer of land for a customary price was known to occur in 
a few places in pre-European Tanzania. Also, a feudal landlord-tenant type of land tenure 
system existed in a few parts of Tanzania. Id. at 194-96. 
111 Coldham, supra note 1, at 200-01. 
112 Id. at 200. 
113 Id. 
114 TANZANIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 83, at 140. 
314 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:297 
socialist models are an aggressive vehicle for the dismantling of an 
inequitable status quo. 
IV. NOTE: AN ISLAMIC MODEL 
Islam is one of the world's major religions with over 240 million 
followers in Africa. 115 Islam is not an ideology in the conventional 
meaning of that word, although it is clearly a philosophy which 
influences extra-spiritual aspects of its adherents' lives. Islam has a 
role in economics and a system of laws, both based on the Koran, 
which numerous Islamic nations have adopted as their complete 
form of governance. 116 With the continued Islamization of northern 
Africa, the question arises whether, and to what extent, nations with 
ties to Islam will put more emphasis on adoption of Islamic law, 
specifically in the area of land tenure legislation. The role of Islamic 
law deserves some attention in this Note as a potentially important 
model for developing African nations. 
A. Nigeria 
Nigeria, though presently ruled by a secular military govern-
ment, 117 is one of many African nations with a historically large 
115 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 591 (l21st ed. 1989). Approximately 860 
million, or 12.7%, of the world's inhabitants are Muslims. Id. 
116 See supra note 4. Islamic economics may not be the complex, almost scientific field 
that capitalism and even socialism are perceived to be, but there are certain presumptions 
about the economic conduct of Muslims which are based on Islamic thought. Islam is not 
necessarily anti-capitalist-though it does have certain prohibitions on usury-but distribution 
of wealth among society's neediest is a basic tenet thereof. SMITH, supra note 4, at 244. The 
legal foundations upon which Islamic law is based are: 
(I) the Holy Quran [Islam's holy book] containing the direct injunctions of God. 
(2) the Sunna. The facts of the life of the Prophet [Mohammed] and his sayings. 
(3) Ijma. The consensus of scholars, which supplemented the words of the Quran 
and the traditions of the Prophet, and which, according to a reported saying of the 
Prophet, was infallible. 
(4) Qujas. Analogical reasoning ex consimili casu from the Quran and Sunna. 
Salamone, The Clash Between Indigenous, Islamic, Colonial and Post-Colonial Law in Nigeria, 21 
J. LEGAL PLURALISM 15,30 (1983). 
117 The military has ruled Nigeria since a December 1983 coup d'etat, when it suspended 
the sections of the 1979 constitution relating to electoral and legislative procedures. BUREAU 
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 7953, BACKGROUND NOTES: NIGERIA 4 
(August, 1987) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: NIGERIA]. Nigeria had a 1987 gross do-
mestic product of approximately $24 billion. With a population estimated at 100 million, the 
per capita G.D.P. was $225. BACKGROUND NOTES: NIGERIA, at 1. Its market price G.N.P. at 
independence (1960) was $4.258 billion. KAMARCK, supra note 68, at 250-51. 
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Muslim population. 118 As to the use and role of Islamic law there, 
one commentator explains that in northern Nigeria, where Islam is 
strongest, "[t]he Shari'a (Islamic law) both is and is not another 
customary law in Northern Nigeria."1l9 Nevertheless, "[n]o matter 
how 'traditional' or 'customary' the Shari'a may be, it has been 
imposed from outside Nigeria, and its current widespread applica-
tion is of relatively recent origin."120 The mix of customary and 
Islamic law is curious, and it would seem that no pure form of 
either exists in northern Nigeria today.121 
Under traditional law in these northern regions, land was com-
munal, tribal, and inalienable. 122 Islam's emphasis is on "the more 
immediate family tie existing between a husband, his wife and their 
children .... "123 The inherent danger in this change to an emphasis 
on familial rights to land from an emphasis on broader communal 
rights is that it could create a great deal of conflict among family 
landholders who hold property which was formerly used or 
"owned" by entire communities or tribes. By narrowing ownership 
rights in this way, Islamic law conflicts with custom. 
While the future role of Islamic law in Nigeria is not now clear, 
"[t]he general movement in Northern Nigeria has been to ration-
118 One source puts Nigeria's Muslim population at almost half. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, 
THE AMERICAN UNIV., NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 123 (H. Nelson 4th ed. 1982) [hereinafter 
NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY]. Of the nineteen federal states in Nigeria, ten are predominandy 
Muslim. There are also sizable Muslim populations in the south of the country. Tabi'u & 
Rashid, The Administration of Islamic Law in Nigeria, 6 ISLAMIC & COMPo L.Q. 27, 27 (1986). 
Ilg Salamone, supra note 116, at 29. See also Tabi'u & Rashid, supra note 118, at 28. 
120 Id. (emphasis in original). 
121 See id. 
122 Id. at 32. As in the other nations discussed to this point, individual interests in land 
are generally limited to usufructuary rights. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 118, at 
148. Possession would generally not be disturbed by the community, which had superior 
rights in the land, as long as the individual used the land for the benefit of his family and 
society. Id. The right to dispose of the property was reserved to the community and its 
traditional authorities, though land could generally be inherited. Id. 
123 Salamone, supra note 116, at 33 (quoting Anderson & Coulson, Islamic Law in Con-
temporary Cultural Change, 18 SAECULUM 13, 16 (1967)). At the national level, Nigeria has a 
rights of occupancy system of land tenure. By the Land Use Act of 1978, lands are vested 
in the governors of the various states of Nigeria and are held by them for the benefit of all 
Nigerians. The governors are empowered to grant rights of occupancy-which they can also 
revoke-to Nigerian citizens. Alienation without prior consent of the authorities is prohibited. 
Oshio, The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 43, 52-53 (1990). Professor Oshio suggests that, although Nigeria's economic model is 
neither capitalist nor socialist, but mixed, the land law as embodied in the Land Use Act 
itself appears to be somewhat closer to the socialist model in principle, though it does not go 
as far as the Tanzanian model. Letter from Professor P. Ehi Oshio to author (on file at the 
offices of the BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL). 
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alize and modernize the Islamic system in order to suppress non-
Islamic traditional systems in the North while opposing westernized 
ones in the rest of Nigeria." 124 It appears, however, that Islamic law 
could play an important role in the future in northern Nigeria. 
B. The Sudan 
Since even before the April 6, 1985 military coup d'etat in the 
Sudan,125 that country has also experienced Islamization of its legal 
system. The Transitional Constitution of 1985, promulgated by the 
new rulers of the nation, provided that "Islamic [Shari'a] and Cus-
tom shall be the main sources of legislation. Personal matters of 
non-muslims shall be governed by their personal laws."126 In a 
change from the previous constitution, which seemed to emphasize 
private ownership, the 1985 document provides that "[t]he right of 
ownership shall be guaranteed to citizens and associations as orga-
nized by the law and such property as organized by law and shall 
not be acquired or appropriated save for public interest and in 
consideration for fair compensation."127 
The land law of the Sudan in general, therefore, "is a combi-
nation of Islamic Law, Customary Law, statutory and judge-made 
law."128 Ownership of land by the state is pervasive, with the gov-
ernment owning virtually all of the unregistered land. 129 
124 Salamone, supra note 116, at 41. 
125 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8022, BACKGROUND NOTES: 
SUDAN 1,4 (August 1985) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: SUDAN]. The Sudan, discussed 
supra in the section on a socialist model, had an estimated population of 21,100,000 in 1984. 
Its 1981-1983 estimated Gross National Product was $27.36 billion, 35%-40% of which was 
attributable to agriculture, and its estimated per capita income (1982) was $361. The Sudanese 
economy's annual growth rate was 2.7% in 1982-83. Id. at 1. At independence (1956), Sudan 
had a market price G.N.P. of $1.333 billion. KARMACK, supra note 68, at 250-51. 
126 DINA SHEIKH EL DIN OSMAN & CARMELLA PISCOPO KEENER, XV CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD-SUDAN 17 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz 1989) (citing Part I, 4 
of the Transitional Constitution of Sudan of 1985). 
127 Id. at 21 (quoting Part III, 25 of the Transitional Constitution of Sudan of 1985). 
128 SAEED MOHAMED AHMED AL-MAHID, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW OF THE SUDAN 
6 (1979). Though custom varied somewhat among the areas of the country, in agricultural 
communities an individual who cleared land retained the right to cultivate it, though he 
could not dispose of it other than to his heirs. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, THE AMERICAN UNIV., 
SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY, 151 (H. Nelson 3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter SUDAN: A COUNTRY 
~~~. . 
129 Gordon, Recent Developments in the Land Law of the Sudan: A Legislative Analysis, 30 J. 
AFR. L. 143, 151 (1986). 
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C. The Future of the Islamic Land Tenure Model 
Aside from the problems which surface as a result of the conflict 
between Islam and custom, and the impracticality of codifying Is-
lamic law at a national level in multicultural nations such as Nigeria 
at the present time, there are other potential defects in the Islamic 
system. Keeping in mind the developmental purpose of land tenure 
reform, a permanent land tenure system whose basic unit of own-
ership and possession is the family seems unwise. 130 This would 
tend to deter extrafamilial succession to land, something which both 
capitalists and socialists would see as detrimental to maximized pro-
duction. It would also work against the concept of collectivization, 
which, although similar to family ownership, has as its goal pro-
duction beyond mere subsistence. This model's emphasis on rights 
of families, however, could have some merit as a provisional element 
in land tenure reform. 
v. CONCLUSION: A MODEL FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The models described above demonstrate that land tenure sys-
tems which are firmly grounded in ideology foreign to the nation 
where they are applied are impractical, awkward, and unlikely to 
succeed. Instead, African and other Third World nations seeking 
to reform their land tenure systems should choose from among the 
better elements of these systems, divorcing successful legal policies 
from burdensome ideological philosophies whenever possible. What 
is proposed in the next few paragraphs is a model of land tenure 
laws using the best elements of the three ideological systems dis-
cussed above. 131 
The basis of this model must be some form of adjudication and 
registration of private plots of land, as in the Kenyan and Malawian 
plans. 132 Registration of privately held lands is necessary for efficient 
alienability of land as it is the only true means of guaranteeing title. 
130 In the Islam-influenced provinces of northern Nigeria, Islamic law tends to recognize 
the role and rights of the family in the inheritance laws. Salamone, supra note 116, at 33. 
131 The author wishes to avoid the temptation, to which many American authors are 
subject, to adopt outright capitalist property principles and land tenure systems as the most 
effective for Africa's future development. One important, ultimate objective is accepted to 
be the focus of the model described herein, however: economic self-sufficiency with some 
level of internal economic competition as a motivating factor, and a healthy, though not 
necessarily absolute, respect for private property rights as a means to this end. 
132 The Kenyan program is discussed supra in section II.A. Malawi's is discussed supra 
in section II.B. 
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By guaranteeing title, investors will feel more secure and are more 
likely to provide the capital necessary for agricultural and industrial 
development. To avoid the flaws of the systems implemented in 
Kenya and Malawi, however, any model must provide for greater 
respect for customary law and rights. 133 
The Kenyan Land (Group Representatives) Act provides strong 
evidence that customary law can be accommodated within virtually 
any political framework. By providing special large ranchlands for 
the Masai which would not be divided into individual plots, the 
Kenyan government was able to legislate without completely dis-
rupting the customs of this population. 134 Efforts such as this should 
be imitated and broadened to include other non-nomadic groups 
in smaller tribal areas. For example, where a rapid shift to a system 
of individual ownership of land conflicts with customary rights, 
which may include familial or tribal rights of ownership, occupancy, 
and succession, laws could be passed which provide for adjudication 
and registration of land in the name of families or larger groups. 
Such laws should stop short of the Tanzanian ujamaa village concept, 
however, which by some accounts went too far in its collectivization 
efforts. 135 To ensure that land may eventually be held by individuals, 
these recognition laws should perhaps be made provisional. For 
example, customary legal units or entities (whether families, tribes, 
or some other group)could'be required to administer over a period 
of time the allocation of collective landholdings to individuals. The 
national government would not intrude upon this gradual allocation 
process. Once the shift from collectively-vested to individually-
vested land tenure is accomplished (presumably by the end of the 
provisional period established in the legislation) the government 
could reasonably require that the uniform registration system con-
trol. Subsequently, only rights to those titles which are legally reg-
istered would be enforceable. 
This temporary legal collectivization of lands could tap the 
resources inherent in tribal or communal living and, at the same 
time, promote among Africans the ideal of a greater community 
133 The Kenyan program, especially, is criticized for clashing with customary land law 
to the point where native Kenyans frequently deal in land without transfer or registration 
of legal title. Customary and legal ownership are often two very different things. See supra 
note 71 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra section II.A. 
135 This is the greatest criticism of Tanzania's ujamaa village program. See supra section 
liLA. See also Coldham, supra nvte 1, at 196-203; TANZANIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 
83, at 140. 
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while deferring to indigenous traditions. Such collectivization could 
. be used to increase awareness of the need to produce beyond sub-
sistence, and to teach these communities the benefits of competition 
without social upheaval. 
Development will not be successful if leaders and lawmakers 
do not take into account the customs of the people they govern. 
Planning without such considerations is a formula for failure, as 
evidenced by the resistance to the adjudication and registration 
program and the villages and ujamaa villages program in Kenya 
and Tanzania, respectively. A more compassionate, gradual road to 
economic development must be adopted, and the legal systems 
which provide the infrastructure for these programs must be the 
vehicle for doing so. Recognition of this need can help African 
nations in their efforts to prosper in the next century. 
Brian C. Dunning 
